Motivation for Asteval

The asteval module allows you to evaluate a large subset of the Python language from within a python program, without using eval(). It is, in effect, a restricted version of Python’s built-in eval(), forbidding several actions, and using (by default) a simple dictionary as a flat namespace. A completely fair question is: Why is this desirable? That is, why not simply use eval(), or just use Python itself?

The short answer is that sometimes you want to allow evaluation of user input, or expose a simple or even scientific calculator inside a larger application. For this, eval() is pretty scary, as it exposes all of Python, which makes user input difficult to trust. Since asteval does not support the import statement (unless explicitly enabled) or many other constructs, user code cannot access the os and sys modules or any functions or classes outside those provided in the symbol table.

Many of the other missing features (modules, classes, lambda, yield, generators) are similarly motivated by a desire for a safer version of eval(). The idea for asteval is to make a simple procedural, mathematically-oriented language that can be embedded into larger applications.

In fact, the asteval module grew out the the need for a simple expression evaluator for scientific applications such as the lmfit and xraylarch modules. An early attempt using the pyparsing module worked but was error-prone and difficult to maintain. While the simplest of calculators or expressiona-evaluators is not hard with pyparsing, it turned out that using the Python ast module makes it much easier to implement a feature-rich scientific calculator, including slicing, complex numbers, keyword arguments to functions, etc. In fact, this approach meant that adding more complex programming constructs like conditionals, loops, exception handling, and even user-defined functions was fairly simple. An important benefit of using the ast module is that whole categories of implementation errors involving parsing, lexing, and defining a grammar disappear. Any valid python expression will be parsed correctly and converted into an Abstract Syntax Tree. Furthermore, the resulting AST is easy to walk through, greatly simplifying the evaluation process. What started as a desire for a simple expression evaluator grew into a quite useable procedural domain-specific language for mathematical applications.

Asteval makes no claims about speed. Evaluating the AST involves many function calls, which is going to be slower than Python - often 4x slower than Python. That said, for certain use cases (see https://stackoverflow.com/questions/34106484), use of asteval and numpy can approach the speed of eval and the numexpr modules.

How Safe is asteval?

Asteval avoids all of the exploits we know about that make eval() dangerous. For reference, see, Eval is really dangerous and the comments and links therein. From this discussion it is apparent that not only is eval() unsafe, but that it is a difficult prospect to make any program that takes user input perfectly safe. In particular, if a user can cause Python to crash with a segmentation fault, safety cannot be guaranteed. Asteval explicitly forbids the exploits described in the above link, and works hard to prevent malicious code from crashing Python or accessing the underlying operating system. That said, we cannot guarantee that asteval is completely safe from malicious code. We claim only that it is safer than the builtin eval(), and that you might find it useful. We also note that several other Python libraries that evaluate user-supplied expressions, including numexpr and sympy use the builtin eval() as part of their processing.

Some of the things not allowed in the asteval interpreter for safety reasons include:

• importing modules. Neither import nor __import__ are supported by default. If you do want to support import and import from, you have to explicitly enable these.

• create classes or modules.

• use string.format(), though f-string formatting and using the % operator for string formatting are supported.

• access to Python’s eval(), getattr(), hasattr(),

  setattr(), and delattr().

• accessing object attributes that begin and end with __, the so-called dunder attributes. This will include (but is not limited to __globals__, __code__, __func__, __self__, __module__, __dict__, __class__, __call__, and __getattribute__. None of these can be accessed for any object.

In addition (and following the discussion in the link above), the following attributes are blacklisted for all objects, and cannot be accessed:

func_globals, func_code, func_closure, im_class, im_func, im_self, gi_code, gi_frame, f_locals, __mro__, _mro

[Note: this list may be incomplete - there may be other disallowed attributes]. While this approach of making a blacklist cannot be guaranteed to be complete, it does eliminate entire classes of attacks known to be able to seg-fault the Python interpreter or give access to the operating system.

An important caveat is that a typical use of asteval will import and expose numpy ufuncs from the numpy module. Several of these can seg-fault Python without too much trouble. If you safety from user input causing segmentation fault is a primary concern, you may want to consider disabling the use of numpy, or take extra care to specify what numpy functions can be used.

In 2024, an independent security audit of asteval done by Andrew Effenhauser, Ayman Hammad, and Daniel Crowley in the X-Force Security Research division of IBM showed insecurities with string.format, so that access to this and string.format_map method were removed. In addition, this audit showed that the numpy submodules linalg, fft, and polynomial expose many exploitable objects, so these submodules were removed by default. If needed, these modules can be added to any Interpreter either using the user_symbols argument when creating it, or adding the needed symbols to the symbol table after the Interpreter is created.

In 2025, William Khem Marquez demonstrated two vulnerabilities: one from leaving some AST objects exposed within the interpreter for user-defined functions (“Procedures”), and one with f-string formatting. Both of these were fixed for version 1.0.6.

There are other categories of safety that asteval may attempt to address, but cannot guarantee success. The most important of these is resource hogging, which might be used for a denial-of-service attack. There is no guaranteed timeout on any calculation, and so a reasonable looking calculation such as:

from asteval import Interpreter
aeval = Interpreter()
txt = """
nmax = 1e8
a = sqrt(arange(nmax))   # using numpy.sqrt() and numpy.arange()
"""
aeval.eval(txt)

can take a noticeable amount of CPU time - if it does not, increasing that value of nmax almost certainly will, and can even crash the Python shell.

As another example, and an illustration of the fundamental problem, consider the Python expression a = x**y**z. For values x=y=z=5, the run time will be well under 0.001 seconds. For x=y=z=8, run time will still be under 1 sec. Changing to x=8, y=9, z=9, Python will ake several seconds (the value is \(\sim 10^{350,000,000}\)) With x=y=z=9, executing that statement may take more than 1 hour on some machines. It is not hard to come up with short program that would run for hundreds of years, which probably exceeds everyones threshold for an acceptable run-time. The point here is tha there simply is not a good way to predict how long any code will take to run from the text of the code itself: run time cannot be determined lexically.

To be clear, for the x**y**z exponentiation example, asteval will raise a runtime error, telling you that an exponent > 10,000 is not allowed. Several other attempts are also made to prevent long-running operations or memory exhaustion. These checks will prevent:

• statements longer than 50,000 bytes.

• values of exponents (p in x**p) > 10,000.

• string operations with strings longer than 262144 bytes

• shift operations with shifts (p in x << p) > 1000.

• more than 262144 open buffers

• opening a file with a mode other than 'r', 'rb', or 'ru'.

These checks happen at runtime, not by analyzing the text of the code. As with the example above using numpy.arange, very large arrays and lists can be created that might approach memory limits. There are countless other “clever ways” to have very long run times that cannot be readily predicted from the text of the code.

By default, the list of supported functions does include Python’s open() – in read-only mode – which will allow disk access to the untrusted user. If numpy is supported, its load() and loadtxt() functions will also normally be supported. By itself, including these functions does not elevate permissions, and access is restricted to ‘read-only mode’. Still, the user of the asteval interpreter would be able to read files with the privileges of the calling program. In some cases, this may not be desirable, and you may want to remove some of these functions from the symbol table, re-implement them, or ensure that your program cannot access information on disk that should be kept private.

The exponential example also highlights the issue that there is not a good way to check for a long-running calculation within a single Python process. That calculation is not stuck within the Python interpreter, but in C code (no doubt the pow() function) called by the Python interpreter itself. That call will not return from the C library to the Python interpreter or allow other threads to run until that call is done. That means that from within a single process, there is not a reliable way to tell asteval (or really, even Python) when a calculation has taken too long: Denial of Service is hard to detect before it happens, and even challenging to detect while it is happening. The only reliable way to limit run time is at the level of the operating system, with a second process watching the execution time of the asteval process and either try to interrupt it or kill it.

For a limited range of problems, you can try to avoid asteval taking too long. For example, you may try to limit the recursion limit when executing expressions, with a code like this:

import contextlib

@contextlib.contextmanager
def limited_recursion(recursion_limit):
    old_limit = sys.getrecursionlimit()
    sys.setrecursionlimit(recursion_limit)
    try:
        yield
    finally:
        sys.setrecursionlimit(old_limit)

with limited_recursion(100):
    Interpreter().eval(...)

In summary, while asteval attempts to be safe and is definitely safer than using eval(), there may be ways that using asteval could lead to increased risk of malicious use. Recommendations for how to improve this situation would be greatly appreciated.